ABSTRACT Service function chaining (SFC) is able to provide customizable network function services to the traffic flows of different IoT subjects. Nowadays, SFC becomes profound to implement the service requirements of different IoT devices with the flexibility and programmability provided by emerging technologies, software defined network (SDN) and network function virtualization. These techniques play an increasingly important role for service deployment and allow the service requirement for certain IoT device to be specified by different subjects, including SDN applications and network managers. However, independent generation of SFC policies by multiple policy makers over the same device may introduce several problems in the process of deploying SFCs to IoT network. Turning the individual considerations into coherent global SFC policies can be challenging. It requires special process of composition and transition, considering the scenario of combining policies with different concerns specified by different entities who have no insight into the policies of others. In this paper, we propose a composition method to solve the anomalies existing in the process of composing distinct policies in the environment of IoT network with multiple IoT service managers. We design two algorithms for the proposed anomaly-free policy composition method, and implement a prototype. Extensive experiment results show that our proposed method can eliminate the anomalies between policies and only induces trivial overhead in the process of generating data plane rules.
I. INTRODUCTION
The past several years has witnessed the rapid development of IoT technology. The increasing number of IoT providers and IoT devices not only brings huge traffic into network but also introduces difficulties in traffic management. Since the technology of SFC allows network manager to specify different requirements for different IoT services, it becomes an efficient way to manage the services requirement of different IoT devices and has drawn great attention from both academic and industrial institutions. SFC refers to a sequence of network functions (e.g, firewall, IDS, proxy) with certain order that are applied to specific traffic flow. It plays an important role in network security, traffic monitor, and QoS maintaining. Traditional network presents several constraints on SFC enforcement [1] , such as:
• The deployment and configuration of network function require manual work.
• The function chaining is constrained by physical topology.
• Network functions are difficult to scale in and scale out. The development of SDN and NFV brings new opportunities to SFC by introducing new features such as flexibility, scalability, and programmability [2] . The combination of SDN and NFV proves to be a more desirable choice for SFC enforcement in the scenario of IoT network.
In real world situation, network administrator may need to combine policies with different concerns that are stated independently. For example, an organization consisting of several departments, each department specifies policies with respect to its own requirements. The result of global policies are composed from department policies. Another example is that when one needs to import policies from other entities, which could be incompatible with existing policies. Moreover, in the context of SDN IoT network, the final global policies may be obtained by combining the policies from different SDN applications and policy makers. In the above scenarios, policy makers from one entity may have no knowledge of other entities. There may exist potential problems among distinct policies in the process of policy composition.
As a countermeasure to these problems, this paper presents a composition method that can detect and solve anomalies between SFC policies specified by different subjects in IoT network. We aim at solving potential problems when composing SFCs, including incompleteness, redundancy, and conflict. The state information embedded inside the SFC is also considered in our work to support the dynamic reaction to different events identified by network functions.
We summarize our contributions of this work as follows:
• Policy composition: We propose a composition method that takes user specified policies (represented as distinct SFCs) as input and outputs a composed anomaly-free policy set in an automatic way.
• Anomaly resolution: We study the anomalies existing between policies systematically and divide them into three different types, incompleteness, redundancy and conflict. We propose a policy composition method to solve these anomalies. Besides, our method can also detect the ambiguities that induced by conflicting intents from different policy makers.
• Dynamic policy adaptation: SFCs that contain the processing results of network functions are regarded as dynamic policies. We define the processing results of network functions as states. The state information embedded inside the policies should be handled carefully in the process of composition to maintain their original intents. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II explains the motivation of our work and describes three types of anomalies occured in policy composition. Section III introduces related works. Section IV gives a brief introduction to the work flow of our proposed composition method. The design and detail of our solution are elaborated in section V. Performance evaluations are conducted in section VI. At the last, we summarize our work and discuss future work in section VIII.
II. MOTIVATION
The increasing number of IoT devices and increasing diversity of their functions bring more complexity to network policies, which significantly increases the difficulty of policy specification in IoT networks. Splitting the responsibilities of policies specification, by function or by scope, for ease of management induces the need of policy composition. Besides, SDN network with multi-application may generate different SFCs corresponding to their own functionalities. Anomalies may occur when putting these SFCs together and combining these application-specified policies with policies from different network managers. Anomalies may also happen in multi-tenant network, where users specify their policies without the knowledge of other tenants or underlaying network. Problems can only be detected at runtime when anomaly phenomenons are discovered by users if there exist no proper mechanism to detect and solve the anomalies during policy composition. Moreover, the statebased SFC makes the problem even more troublesome. All these issues urge us to find practical solutions.
However, selecting policy chain naively with flow classifier [3] , [4] may lead to several problems: 1) The pre-setting requirements cannot be satisfied. Only the first matched SFC is selected, other matched entries are ignored. 2) Policies may repeat each other partially or completely, which would significantly slow the speed of processing.
3) The implicit conflict and redundancy may not be identified.
Further, solutions such as sequential composition [5] method cannot solve the problems above either, where policy makers from one entity may have no knowledge about the SFCs specified by other entities. There are chances that network functions in SFCs contradict with each other or repeat each other, which may harm the security and reliability of network potentially.
Moreover, composing policy manually suffers from manual mistakes. As a result, we recommend an automated composition method with consideration of dynamic events in the network to achieve efficient and anomaly-free composition of distinct network policies as a countermeasure to previous problems existed in current works.
For better understanding, Figure 1 illustrates the problems in policy composition and how existing approaches fail to solve them. The end groups and network functions are represented using ellipses and squares respectively. There are three distinct SFCs. SFC 1 is a state-based SFC focusing on security requirement, while SFC 2 and SFC 3 are responsible for network accelerating and traffic monitoring, respectively. Assuming a flow from end point 2 (Ep 2 ) to Ep 3 , without policy composition, the flow classifier may only consider SFC 2 , and ignore SFC 3 that also matches this flow. This obviously fails to satisfy the SFC requirements. Moreover, the sequential composition method simply connects SFC 2 and SFC 3 , which may lead to incorrect processing results. For example, the Packet Counter's output maybe incorrect because the NAT modifies the header of the packets. Also, the redundancy of WAN Accelerator may influence the correct enforcement of SFC. VOLUME 6, 2018 Motivated by previous discussion, this paper presents an automatic composition method to solve the following anomalies among policies in the process of policy composing.
• Incompleteness: Different policy makers may assign different policies to identical network traffic, which, means that among multiple policies applied to the same type of flow, each of these policies holds only partial service functions that a flow is required to pass through.
• Redundancy: Identical polices for the same flow or unnecessary repetition of service functions are regarded as redundancy. They are common problems when combining policies specified by different entities. Both the state information and branches of policies should be analyzed carefully to maintain their original intents when eliminating the redundant network function instances.
• Conflict: The behavior of network functions in one SFC may conflict with another. For instance, one function may depend on certain packet fields that have been unexpectedly modified by other functions placed in front of it. This kind of conflict may occur between network functions in individual policy or between network functions from multiple policies applying to the same flow.
III. RELATED WORK
The related works are divided into there subsections, the development of SFC technology, SFC for IoT network, and policy composition.
A. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SFC
In traditional network, it is extremely complicate and expensive to insert a new SFC policy or update an existing one. Emerging technology SDN proves to be a feasible solution [6] . And there are plenty of research works studying the way to steer traffic between network functions using the SDN technology recently. Several works [7] - [9] leverage additional information steering traffic between middleboxes to satisfy policy requirements. Those are great practice of SFC enforcement based on the technology of SDN, but the manual deployment and configuration of network functions are still required in these solutions. Besides, they did not consider policy composition. The development of virtualization technology allows the network services to be implemented as virtual functions. Reference [10] presents a multi-tenant framework where tenant users can choose their own virtual service functions to manage their own traffic independently. This is a target scenario of our proposed method, but the proposed framework may suffer from the problems between policies such as conflict and redundancy. PSI [11] proposes a context-based policy abstraction for security state awareness of network. However, it did not consider the anomalies between policies either. Reference [12] studies the optimal placement of VNF by taking the computing overhead into consideration. Reference [13] proposes a SDN-based NFV chaining architecture that extending the OpenFlow protocol to reduce the control traffic overhead. Reference [14] proposed a SFC construction mechanism using VLAN tags as policy number. And [15] improves it by suggesting traffic steering solution based on VLAN tags in OpenStack.
As for the contributions from industry area, the open source communities and enterprises of SFC and NFV are actively engaged into the design and development of new ideal that enabling SDN based virtualized SFC. For example, Cisco introduces Network Service Header (NSH) [16] to represents service path in the network as an additional header into packet. Another solution from Ericsson [17] addresses traffic steering problem by forcing the routing over a specific path using OpenFlow 1.3. The packet is reclassified in every service function forwarder using existing information in header. There are many SDN controllers and open source platforms support the implementation of SFC. For example OpenStack includes an open source SFC solution based on a Neutron plugin extension for OVS [18] . The OpenDaylight platform supports SFC southbound protocol that compliant to the NSH specification. And ONOS, a famous SDN controller, includes a component that implements the SFC requests from network service project of OpenStack, allowing creating resources using REST APIs.
B. SFC FOR IoT NETWORK
It is widely accepted that SFC based on the technology of SDN and NFV will significantly simplify the management of IoT network by saving the cost and time for network function configuration and new service introduction [19] . There are more and more works studying the deployment of SFC in different IoT networks. For example, [20] proposes a SFC based mechanism focusing on optimizing hospital remote-monitoring network. The security problems of SFC in IoT network also raises researcher's attention. For instance [21] , proposes a security architecture for composing security services specified for different IoT devices. Reference [22] proposed an SFC orchestration system to promote the performance and resource utilization rate for IoT network that supports dynamic service deployment of SFC in cloud environment.
C. POLICY COMPOSITION
Reference [23] points out the need for network administrator to compose policies that are distributively specified. Studies of policy composition in traditional network [24] , [25] mainly focus on authorization policies and the abstract semantic conflicts between them. Our work is different from them for that we consider the sequence of network functions and their dependencies of different packet fields. Several works about policy composition introduce parallel and sequential operator for policy composition [26] , [27] . However, all of them focus on the conflicts between rules generated by the control plane. Our work is different from theirs in that we focus on the input policies from the application layer, which means that we attempt to figure out what network policy makers want to do, instead of how to do it. Reference [5] and [28] present frameworks for composing separate module into one complete program. However, neither of them considers the potential anomalies between policies. Reference [29] presents an algorithm to compose policies with conflict detection. But it fails to consider state-based SFC. Also, the tree structure of labels for end points employed in this work is not suitable for complex overlap situation other than hierarchical network structure.
IV. OVERVIEW
The workflow of our framework is illustrated in Figure 2 . Network managers and network applications specify their intents through a set of SFCs. We take these policies as input of our framework and send composing result to the controller of SDN and NFV architecture, where the policies are processed and translated into data plane rules. The composing engine is responsible for policy composing and anomaly resolving, while user interfaces allow network administrators to specify their own intents independently. Detailed workflow of composing engine is depicted in Figure 3 . As we can see, the workflow of composing engine consists of two phases, each of which is divided into three steps. In the process of preprocessing, policies are decomposed to avoid the intersection end groups. While the process of composition solves the anomalies listed in section II. In the process of policy combination, each policies applying to the same flow will be connected to form an integral policy. The redundancy elimination process then handles the duplicates of unnecessary network function by analyzing the structure and state information inside SFCs. The function rearrangement process solves the conflicts in policies leveraging dependency relationships obtained by network function behavior analysis. Finally, the anomaly-free policies are generated and sent to the controller to generate data plane rules. Detailed design of each step will be explained in the next section.
V. DESIGN
Network policies are the input of our framework. They are described by a set of distinct SFCs, specifying the sequences and rule sets of network functions applying to different flows. One complete SFC consists of three key components: 1) the identifier for flow matching, 2) the network functions with specific sequence that flows are required to pass through, 3) rules of network functions.
The identifier of SFC defines the properties of a flow that this SFC applies to. It can be extended to multi-dimension that includes port and flag information of packet. We consider only the address of end point for ease of explanation.
Assuming E the set of end groups, F the function chain, R the rule set list of network function and P the set of all policies, respectively. We can describe a network policy P ∈ P using three tuple E, F, R . For example, if all traffic from E1 to E2 is required to go through the detection of IDS, this policy could be described as P =< {src : E1, dst : E2} , {IDS} , {IDSrules} >.
A. PREPROCESS
The intersection of end groups between policies induces ambiguity in policy enforcement. The goal of this phase is to decompose policies, according to the end point groups, into proper granularity. Usually, the policy P obtained from input may overlap with others, as the following equations holds:
(1)
Whereas ep(P) represents either source end group or destination end group of policy P. The overlap relationship between end groups are divided into two categories, totally overlap and partially overlap, described by equation 1 and 2 respectively. After this preprocess, end points of each policy P ∈ P will be disjoint:
This phase is further divided into three steps in our design, namely, end point scanning, policy decomposing, and policy aggregation. The detail and principles of them are explained as follows.
1) END POINT SCANNING
We analyze end points of each user-input policy to decide which end group to decompose and the proper granularity. In this process, every policy is scanned to obtain end group library ep, an end point group will be split as long as it intersects with others. We can obtain disjoint end point groups after this process.
For every ep(P 1 ) and ep(P 2 ) ∈ ep that satisfying ep(P 1 ) ∩ ep(P 2 ) = ep(P 1 ), applying following operation:
Group ep(P 2 ) is removed and group ep(P 2 ) − ep(P 1 ) is inserted to eliminate the intersection between ep(P 1 ) and ep(P 2 ) in group library.
For the condition of partial overlap satisfying ep(P 1 ) ∩ ep(P 2 ) = ∅, ep(P 1 ), ep(P 2 ), the following operation is applied:
As shown in equation 5, both ep(P 2 ) and ep(P 1 ) are removed from end group library. While three new end point group (the intersection of ep(P 2 ) and ep(P 1 ), ep(P 1 ) minus the intersection, ep(P 2 ) minus the intersection) are inserted.
2) POLICY DECOMPOSITION
The decomposed ep set from previous step is used to decompose policy in this process. F x and R x are used to represent the functions and rule sets of P x , respectively. Every P x ∈ P that satisfying ep(P x ) / ∈ ep is required to be decomposed. The process of policy decomposition can be represented using following expressions:
ep(P x ) here are decomposed to n groups ep(P x1 ), ep(P x2 ), . . . , ep(P xn ) storing in ep, the policy P x should also be decomposed to n new policies respecting to the ep. Function chain and rule sets of decomposed policy will stay the same, while the end group is split up.
3) POLICY AGGREGATION
At the final phase of preprocess, we collect policies applying to the same flow together. Two policies P 1 , P 2 are regarded as being applied to the same flow if they satisfy:
Those policies with same end group will be aggregated together in set G. All of these groups forming a set P as the input of next stage.
We design an algorithm (Algorithm 1) to implement the preprocess. sp(P) and ep(P) denote source end points and destination end points, respectively.
Algorithm 1 Preprocess of Service Function Chaining
Input: P = {P 1 , . . . P x }, a set of policy chains; P = ∅, a set of decomposed policy chains; Output: P 1 /*scanning end point*/; 2 L s = ∅, L d = ∅ /*src and dst end point library*/; 3 foreach P ∈ P do 4 if sp(P) overlap with element L ∈ L s then 5 /*remove old end point and insert new one*/;
13 /*policy decompose*/; 14 P temp = ∅; 15 foreach P ∈ P do 16 if L s contains sp(P)==false then 17 P temp ← P temp ∪decompose(P, L s );
18
if L d contains dp(P)==false then 19 
20 /*policy aggregation*/; 21 foreach P t ∈ P temp do 22 find group G p t = P 1 , . . . P n t of P t in P temp ;
23
remove G p t from P temp ;
24
P ← P ∪ G p t ; 25 return P ;
B. COMPOSITION
We compose policies and solve anomalies in the phase. This phase is also divided into three steps, policy combination, redundancy elimination, and function rearrangement corresponding to three kinds of anomalies.
1) POLICY COMBINATION
Policies applied to the same end point groups are aggregated into a certain set G x ∈ P in previous step. What to do in this step is connecting policies in the same set to obtain a complete service chain by considering all input policies applied to the same flow. Sequential method >> is employed to connect service chains. The policy P x deduced from combination of policies in G x that consists of n x policies can be represented as:
The expression of F 1 >> F 2 simply connect two policy chains together by putting F 2 after F 1 . The expression of R 1 >> R 2 simply puts rule set list R 2 after R 1 .
2) REDUNDANCY ELIMINATION
As mentioned before, there may exist redundancy between policies, which can lead to latency and potential fail in the process of policy enforcement. For all service function f x , f y in the policy chain of P z with the same type, we apply the following operation to eliminate redundancy:
The principles of operator is depicted in Figure 4 . We split the condition of redundancy into three types, namely, redundancy of non-branch policy chain (a) and (b), redundancy between branch points (c) and (d), and redundancy between branches with non-branch (e) and (f). In this figure The rules of service function f is denoted as r(f ) in equation 9 . f x and f y are removed from rule list R z and their combination is inserted. The insert position is corresponding to the green box in Figure 4 .
3) FUNCTION REARRANGEMENT
The functions inside a combined SFC may conflict with each other. For example, the rule inside a Packet Counter may record the number of packet according to the source IP address. However, this field may be modified by other function placed before the Counter. We detect this kind of conflicts by analyzing the dependencies between network function rules and packet field and solve them by reordering. Conflicts that cannot be solved by reordering will be sent to network administrator. We divide the actions performed by network functions on packet into read action, write action, and none. Two functions are related if they perform write or read operation of the same packet field. In Figure 5 (a) and 5(b), the read and write actions will not influence the proper work of other functions. As for 5(c), F 1 modifies field A depended by F 2 , leading to the fail of F 2 . Our algorithm solves this problem by putting F 2 before F 1 . In Figure 5 (d), both F 2 and F 3 are trying to modify field C, this should be reported to network manager for that this kind of flaw is caused by the conflicting intents from different policy makers and we will always violate one of the policy maker no matter what order we choose.
Algorithm 2 illustrates the process of policy composition. With our proposed method, the anomalies in Figure 1 can 
Algorithm 2 Policy Composition Algorithm
Input: P = {G 1 , . . . , G n }, a set of decomposed policies; P = ∅, a set of recomposed policies; Output: P ; 1 /*policy compositin*/; 2 foreach G in P do 3 P G = null;
8 /*redundancy elimination*/; 9 depend_info=null; 10 foreach P G ∈ P do 11 f x , f y =get_redundancy(F G );
18 return P ; VOLUME 6, 2018 be fixed. The composing result is shown in Figure 6 . Our algorithm analyzes the end point group of input policy and rearranges them into 4 new groups. SFC 1 and SFC 2 are combined, forming SFC 2 to satisfy the requirement of completeness. SFC 2 and SFC 3 are also combined. The redundancy of WAN accelerator between SFC 2 and SFC 3 is eliminated. The packet counter is placed before NAT in SFC 3 to avoid conflicts. 
VI. EVALUATION
The performance evaluation and result analysis of our proposed composition method are introduced in this section. Our experiment is conducted in following three aspects:
• A1: Evaluation with varying input SFC • A2: Evaluation of time overhead inside controller • A3: Evaluation of number of new policy edges Those three metrics measure the performance influences on application layer, control layer, and data plane, respectively.
A. ENVIRONMENT AND DATA SET
The composition framework is implemented in Java with about 4k lines of code. We extend OpenDaylight SFC module to make it compatible with our work. All of the programs are running in Ubuntu 14.04 of 4GB memory and Intel Core 2.5GHz CPU.
The data set A consists of about 6k different policies (with average length of 4) generated according to large company network. We also modify data set A with randomly added middleboxes and rules named dataset B (with average length of 10) to test the scalability of our method. In real word, most SFCs are of length around 4 and nearly all SFCs are shorter than 10 [29] . By analyzing these policies, we discover that the end groups of each policy are different, from several end points to different hosts inside different subnets. The length and type of different policies chain are also different, with some consisting numbers of complex middleboxes while others very few.
B. EVALUATION WITH VARYING INPUT SERVICE FUNCTION CHAINING
This evaluation measures the running time of our method with policies of different length and numbers. The results are shown in Figure 7 . We can see that, the time for policy composing increases with the increasing number of policies. This is because both the preprocess phase and composition phase need more time when handling more policies. Further, the time consumption of composing policies in data set A is less than that of data set B. This is because data set A has a shorter average length of service chain. The longer the service chain is, the more complicated the composition phase is. Over all, our proposed approach can process thousands of policies within minutes, which we believe is acceptable in real world scenarios.
C. EVALUATION OF TIME OVERHEAD INSIDE CONTROLLER
In this evaluation, we measure the performance penalty of controller on generating data plane rule. Figure 8 plots the time latency with respect to the number of policies. The results are quite consistent with the former experiment in Figure 7 . The latency increases slightly (around several milliseconds) with the increasing number of policies and the increasing length of the service chain. However, even in the worst case, the controller can generate rules within 3.5 milliseconds. That is, the performance penalty inside the controller is trivial. 
D. EVALUATION OF NUMBER OF NEW POLICY EDGES
The number of output edge is a little bit larger than that of the input edge. We believe the reason for this is that the overlapping policies are decomposed into more separate policies. However, the differences between the number of output edge and the input edge are quite small. Further, the number of edges generated by our method grows linearly with the increasing number of input edge, which indicates that our algorithms are capable of solving the anomalies between policies without overwhelming the data plane.
VII. POLICY COMPOSITION IN ACTION
We illustrate several policy composition examples inspired by real world situation to help explaining how three types of anomalies can be solved using our composition method in this section. Figure 10 gives two policies generated by security application and traffic quality application respectively. We can observe that the Ep A exists in the source ep groups of both SFC while Ep B appears in the destination ep groups these two policy too. These means both of those two SFCs should be applied to the flow from Ep A to Ep B . To satisfy all those requirements from different apps, we can traverse all SFCs and connected all matched SFCs in the runtime. However, it is time consuming to perform the same action repeatedly when the same flow comes again and will introduce technique complexity to implementation. We solve these problem by decomposing the ep group and ensure there are no intersections between eps from different policies. Policies in Figure 10 will be decomposed into three new policies depicted in 11. And SFC 3 applied to flow from Ep A to Ep b can satisfy service requirements specified by both SFC 1 and SFC 2 . 
A. SOLVING INCOMPLETENESS

B. SOLVING REDUNDANCY
It is common for policies stated by different subjects to repeat each other. For example, both SFC 1 and SFC 2 in Figure 12 contain state based firewalls. Our method will analysis the type of service functions and remove repeated functions before connecting different policies together. During the composition process, those two firewalls will be combined into one, with their output paths combined, according to the state label in assigned, as well. The result is shown in Figure 13 . Besides, we have detected that 9% of policies in our datasets contains redundant network function instances. Eliminating these redundancy could help simplify and accelerate the process of policy deployment, as well as reduce the probability of mistakes. Simply connecting SFC 1 and SFC 2 together by putting NAT before firewall and IDS will let the traffic that should be blocked by firewall bypasses the firewall rule. Our method will detect the dependencies between different rules and rearrange the order of service functions to make sure all of the rules assigned to different middleboxes coming into effect when connecting SFCs. In the output policy illustrated in Figure 15 , the NAT is placed after firewall to make sure that the write action on destination IP field of NAT will not affect the firewall rule that reads the same filed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have designed an automated way to enable the composition of network policies represented by SFCs which are stated independently for datas from IoT devices. Our method is based on two emerging technologies, SDN and NFV. Problems such as conflict, incompleteness, and redundancy between different policies can be solved with our proposed algorithms. We also implement a prototype of our proposed policy composition method. We evaluate the performance by measuring the time overhead introduced by our method to prove the practicality. The results show that we can solve different anomalies in policy composition efficiently. As future work, we attempt to leverage new data structure for performance improvement. Also, more works, such as formal verification, are expected to be added in our system in the near future. 
